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Abstract
This study aimed to better understand the cognitive underpin-
nings of people’s intuitions concerning the conjunction rule of
probabilities. Using a novel methodology to study the con-
flict between representativeness and logic considerations in the
conjunction fallacy, results revealed that, contrary to what is
commonly assumed, assessments of representativeness are not
automatic and rapid but are in fact most influential when par-
ticipants are not pressured by time to provide a judgment. Im-
plications for the different dual-system accounts of probability
judgments will be discussed.
Keywords: Conjunction fallacy, Probability judgments, Intu-
ition, Dual processes, Representativeness, Time pressure.
Introduction
The question of whether we can intuitively appreciate math-
ematical concepts has puzzled many psychologists and lin-
guists (e.g., see Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). There is some strong
evidence that this achievement is not beyond our capabilities.
For example, Young Brazilian candy sellers with little for-
mal education can outperform their non-sellers counterparts
on complex ratio-comparison problems presented in familiar
formats (i.e., using candies and bills) without using pen or
paper (Saxe, 1988). Yet, the automatisation of mathematical
operations can have its shortcomings. For example, erroneous
intuitions about probabilities have been demonstrated numer-
ous times. One striking example concerns intuitions about the
conjunction rule, a basic probability law which does not seem
to be intuitively grasped by individuals (Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1983). According to this rule, the probability of a con-
junction of two events A and B, or Pr(A∧B), cannot exceed
the probability of any of its constitutive events, namely Pr(A)
or Pr(B). In certain situations, however, most individuals will
erroneously judge that Pr(A∧B) is more probable than one
of its constitutive probabilities, an error known as the “con-
junction fallacy” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Tversky and
Kahneman (1983) provided a paradigmatic illustration of this
error with the “Linda problem”. In this problem, individuals
are asked to read the following thumbnail description:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.
She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply
concerned with issues of discrimination and social jus-
tice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstra-
tions. (p. 297)
In the most transparent test of individuals’ intuition for the
conjunction rule, the authors asked participants to decide
which of the two following alternatives was more probable:
(1) Linda is a bank teller.
(2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist
movement.
Overall, 85% of respondents chose (2) over (1), thus re-
vealing that their intuitive answer was at odds with the con-
junction rule.
Why Does our Intuition Fail us?
There are two main types of accounts to explain the discrep-
ancy between participants’ intuitions and the objective math-
ematical rule in conjunction tasks. The first type of account
focuses on linguistic ambiguities inherent in the task (e.g., see
Hertwig, Benz, & Krauss, 2008; Politzer & Noveck, 1991).
Researchers who emphasised the role of linguistic ambigu-
ity proposed, notably, that people inferred that (1) implicitly
negated the possibility that Linda was a feminist when asked
to compare (1) and (2) (see e.g., Politzer & Noveck, 1991). In
other words, when asked to compare Pr(A) and Pr(A∧B), in-
dividuals would instead compare Pr(A∧ not-B) and Pr(A∧B).
In this case, considering that Pr(A∧ not-B) is greater than
Pr(A∧B) can no longer be deemed to be a ‘fallacy’. There is,
however, evidence to show that removing the ambiguity is not
sufficient to perfectly realign people’s intuitions with mathe-
matical rules. Thus, Tentori, Bonini, and Osherson (2004)
asked individuals to evaluate Pr(A), Pr(A ∧ B), as well as
Pr(A∧ not-B)1. Results showed that the majority of partic-
ipants erroneously believed that Pr(A∧B) was more probable
than Pr(A).
The second type of account, so-called the attribute-
substitution account (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahne-
man, 2003), is presented as a more specific, process-oriented
extension of the representativeness heuristic account (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1983). According to Kahneman and Fred-
erick (2002; but see also, Kahneman, 2003), people’s intu-
itions deviate from normative expectations because individu-
als assess an explicit target attribute of a judgment by sub-
stituting a related heuristic attribute that comes more readily
to mind. So, according to this account, people use represen-
tativeness or similarity as a heuristic attribute to gauge the
probability that Linda is a bank teller and a feminist and the
probability that she is a bank teller. Accordingly, since Linda
appears more representative of a feminist bank teller than a
1where the explicit mention of Pr(A∧ not-B) prevents partici-
pants to interpret A as referring to A-but-not-B.
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bank teller, people believe that she is more likely to be both a
feminist and a bank teller than a bank teller.
Does our Intuition AlwaysMislead us?
There is a confound in Linda problems that has yet to be ad-
dressed. People’s intuitions have been assessed with one of
two methodologies. One procedure consists in asking indi-
viduals to rank order different events according to their prob-
ability of being true. These events encompass—solely, or
among others—the conjunction of two events and each of
these two events in isolation. The other procedure consists in
asking participants to give a numerical estimate of the proba-
bility that the conjunction is true, as well as the probabilities
that each of its constitutive events are true2.
In both cases, there are two ways in which participants’
intuitions can be fallacious. They can believe that the con-
junction is more probable than any of its constitutive events
or they can believe that the conjunction is more probable than
one of its constitutive events but not the other. Tversky and
Kahneman (1983) reported that 85% participants believed
Linda resembled more a typical feminist bank teller than a
bank teller (A∧BB) but also that she resembled more a typ-
ical feminist than a feminist bank teller (A  A∧B). There-
fore, if individuals assess the explicit probability attribute by
substituting a related representativeness attribute, they should
only commit the conjunction fallacy when comparing the
least representative event and the conjunction of the least rep-
resentative and the most representative one. In other words,
they should erroneously believe that Pr(A∧B) > Pr(B) but
they should also correctly infer that Pr(A) > Pr(A∧B). Un-
fortunately, the authors did not report probability judgments
for most probable event Pr(A). But in a recent study, Hertwig
et al. (2008, Experiment 2) data suggesting that nearly 70%
of participants who committed the conjunction fallacy con-
sidered that the conjunction was more probable than one of
its constituting events, but nevertheless correctly inferred that
the conjunction was less probable than the second constitutive
event.
This result suggests that our intuition can sometimes be
aligned with rules of mathematics, that it does not always
mislead us. The issue, therefore, lies in identifying whether
these correct intuitions are solely determined by heuristic pro-
cessing (i.e., considerations of representativeness) or whether
they reflect a sensititivity to the logic of sets which underpins
the conjunction rule. The current procedures and available
empirical results, however, do not allow a more precise de-
termination of whether participants actually detect the con-
flict between what considerations of representativeness dic-
tate and what the logic of sets entails. This is because the role
of intuitions about the logic of sets and intuitions based on
representativeness considerations are not experimentally ma-
nipulated in the tasks commonly used. One main contribu-
2A variant of this procedure consists in asking frequency esti-
mates. This can greatly reduce the proportions of erroneous judg-
ments (see e.g., Hertwig et al., 2008) but does not address, in itself,
the issue of the origin of the erroneous probabilistic intuitions.
tion of the present study is to propose a new methodology for
studying the conjunction fallacy which will make it possible
to test for the separate effects of logic and representativeness
assessments on judgments.
Two Modes of Cognitive Functioning
A key element of the attribute-substitution account is the fact
that the result of the evaluation of the heuristic attribute is
presented as effortless and immediate (Kahneman, 2003). In
other words, individuals are assumed to be able to judge how
representative Linda is of a feminist or a bank teller almost
synchronously upon reading the problem. As such, Kahne-
man (2003) argues, judgments based on representativeness
originate from an intuitive mode of cognitive function, within
which judgments are made rapidly and automatically. The
author then contrasts this intuitive mode of functioning with
a controlled mode, described as deliberate and slower. This
dual-system view of cognition has gained considerable in-
fluence in the past decade in research examining judgment,
decision-making or reasoning (e.g., see Evans, 2008; Kah-
neman, 2003; Sloman, 1996). According to this view, the
second, more deliberate, system will either be at the ori-
gin of the judgment provided or simply monitor its quality.
From this theoretical perspective, the conjunction fallacy re-
sults from the generation of a representativeness-based im-
pression by the first, more intuitive system, while the second,
slower and more deliberative, system fails to detect and cor-
rect the inference based on similarity. Kahneman and Freder-
ick (2002) argued the controlled mode of cognitive function-
ing only loosely monitors the output of the intuitive system.
Kahneman (2003) added that individuals will often be sat-
isfied with the first plausible judgment that comes to mind
and only will only rarely think hard to produce their judg-
ment. There are concrete, empirically testable, predictions
that can be derived from this position. Namely, Kahneman
and Frederick’s lax-monitoring view suggests that judgments
observed in conjunction problems should always be rapid and
automatic and solely influenced by considerations of repre-
sentativeness.
The lax-monitoring view is at odds with other conceptions
of dual-system cognition. There is evidence pointing to the
possibility that individuals are, to some extent, sensitive to
the conflict existing between heuristic and more analytical
considerations. In reasoning, this is best illustrated by the
belief bias phenomenon (Evans, Barton, & Pollard, 1983).
Belief bias is illustrated by asking participants to evaluate
syllogisms which vary both according to their logical valid-
ity (i.e., whether their conclusion logically follows from the
premises) and their believability (i.e., whether the conclu-
sions is congruent with prior beliefs). Evans et al. (1983)
showed believable conclusions were more often endorsed
than unbelievable ones but also that valid conclusions were
more often endorsed than invalid ones. Moreover, Evans and
Curtis-Holmes (2005) showed that the main effect of logic
disappeared under time pressure, which is consistent with the
proposition that heuristic responses would be automatic and
2981
immediate but that, when the slower controlled mode of func-
tioning can intervene, such responses are modified.
This conflict-monitoring view has recently also gained sup-
port in research on probability judgments. Thus, individuals
who do not judge that the conjunction is more probable than
any of its constitutive events will spend more time on produc-
ing a judgment (De Neys, 2006). Additionally, De Neys and
Glumicic (2008, Experiment 2) showed that individuals took
longer to make a judgment based on conflicting analytical and
heuristic pieces of information. They gave participants infor-
mation about the composition of a sample (e.g., 996 women
and 4 men) and a short personality description supposedly
drawn at random from that sample. The description was ei-
ther congruent with stereotypes of the larger group or with
stereotypes of the smaller group and hence, incongruent with
the stereotypes of the larger group. For example, an incon-
gruent description for the above sample described Jo as a stu-
dent in engineering, who likes to go cruising, listen to loud
music and drink beer. Participants took longer to correctly
infer that the individual most probably belonged to the larger
group when the description was incongruent with stereotypes
on that group. Here again, concrete predictions can be derived
from the conflict-monitoring view for conjunction probabil-
ity judgments. First, statements presenting the most repre-
sentative outcome as the most probable should be more of-
ten endorsed than statements presenting an unrepresentative
outcome as most probable. Second, statements presenting a
single event (independently of its representativeness) as more
probable than a conjunction should be more often endorsed
than statements presenting the conjunction of events as more
probable. Third, the latter effect should disappear under time
pressure because the controlled mode of cognitive function-
ing will no longer be able to exert its slower-paced monitor-
ing.
Experiment
The following experiment was designed to test the competing
predictions of the lax-monitoring view (Kahneman & Fred-
erick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003) and the conflict-monitoring
view (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) of cognitive functioning
in order to better understand the cognitive underpinnings of
people’s intuitions concerning the conjunction rule of prob-
abilities. It first aimed to establish whether those intuitions
were solely driven by heuristic processing (lax-monitoring
view) or whether they were resulting from a combination
of heuristic and controlled processing (conflict-monitoring
view). The methodology used was adapted from the proce-
dure used in belief-bias studies of reasoning (Evans & Curtis-
Holmes, 2005). A second objective of this study was to as-
sess the effect of time pressure on those probabilistic intu-
itions. Based on the theoretical predictions of the two-system
view of cognition, it was expected that participants required
to respond rapidly would show an increased level of heuristic
processing and a reduced level of logical responding.
Method
Participants Participants were recruited by second-year
psychology students at the University of Toulouse, France,
as a course requirement. Each student emailed or contacted
several men and women who were older than 18 to invite
them to take part in an on-line study. Of the 127 partici-
pants in the final sample, 24 already knew the Linda prob-
lem. Three participants took over two hours to complete the
test, and another ten participants allocated to the limited time
condition spent more than 12 seconds on average to provide
an answer. All these participants were removed from sub-
sequent analyses. Of the remaining 90 participants (43 men
and 47 women; mean age = 29.85, SD = 12.52), 31% had
post-graduate education, 36% had undergraduate education,
24% had graduated from high school, and the remaining 9%
had left education before graduating from high school. Their
background knowledge was diverse, ranging from maths and
science (26%), social sciences (19%), services (21%), Tech-
nology and design (17%). The experiment was conducted in
French and all participants were native French speakers.
Materials Two scenarios used were based upon the original
Linda and Bill descriptions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983),
respectively. In addition, ten new descriptions were modelled
after these original texts. A crucial difference between these
twelve tasks and the original Linda problem, however, was
the judgment task.
The materials used in this study presented participants
with a unique statement which they could either accept as
correct or reject as incorrect. The statements presented
fell into four categories: Correct-Congruent (CC), Correct-
Incongruent (CI), Incorrect-Congruent (IC), and Incorrect-
Incongruent (II). Table 1 provides an illustration of the four
types of conclusions for the Linda problem. Note, however,
that different scenarios were used for each of the twelve tasks
created in the experiment so that all statements referred to
different contents.
Table 1: Illustration of the four types of statements used to
study the conjunction fallacy
Possible statements
CC The fact that Linda is a feminist is more likely than
the fact that she is a feminist and a bank teller.
CI The fact that Linda is a bank teller is more likely
than the fact that she is a feminist and a bank teller.
IC The fact that Linda is a feminist and a bank teller
is more likely than the fact that she is a bank teller.
II The fact that Linda is a feminist and a bank teller
is more likely than the fact that she is a feminist.
Note. CC: Correct-Congruent, CI: Correct-Incongruent, IC:
Incorrect-Congruent, II: Incorrect-Incongruent.
Correct statements proposed that an event was more likely
than a conjunction of this event and another as in (3) or, al-
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Figure 1: Screen shot of the training task
ternatively, that the conjunction was less likely than one of its
constitutive events.
(3) The fact that Linda is a feminist is more likely than
the fact that she is a feminist and a bank teller.
Conversely, an incorrect statement proposed that the con-
junction was more likely than its constitutive events or, alter-
natively, that one of its constitutive event was less likely than
the conjunction, as in (4).
(4) The fact that Simon is a businessman is less likely than
the fact that he is a businessman and an opera singer.
Congruency was determined by the description presented.
Each description was designed so that the individual pre-
sented appeared as a highly representative member of a given
category without explicitly mentioning that this individual ac-
tually belonged to that category. Congruency was manipu-
lated by presenting either the representative event or the un-
representative event as most likely.
Design and procedure Participants were randomly allo-
cated to one of two experimental conditions: the free time
or the limited time condition. A screen explained that they
would be presented with thumbnail descriptions of a person
followed by a statement. They were asked to read the descrip-
tion carefully and to indicate if they thought the statement
was correct (free time condition) or indicate if they thought
the statement was correct as fast as possible (italics added,
limited time condition).
The next screen presented an example of a thumbnail de-
scription. Participants were asked to read the description at-
tentively and to click on a “Continue” button when they were
ready. Upon clicking, a probability statement appeared and
they were instructed to click on a “yes” or “no” box to indi-
cate whether or not they thought the statement was correct.
In the free time group, participants could take as long as they
wished to provide an answer. In the limited time group, a
clock and a countdown appeared 5 seconds after the presen-
tation of the statement and went down for another 7 seconds,
followed by the message: “Respond now!” (see Figure 1 for
a screenshot). The next screen informed participants that they
would now enter the test. The experimental tasks were pre-
sented in a random order, following the same procedure as
that of the example task. Each time, the program recorded
the participant’s choice (accept or reject the conclusion) and
the time taken to respond from the moment the conclusion ap-
peared on the screen until the participant clicked a box. After
they had provided all their answers, participants were asked
to fill in demographic information and were thanked for their
participation. The experiment used a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed de-
sign. The within-subject factors were the logical validity of
the statement (correct vs. incorrect) and the congruency be-
tween the event or conjunction presented as most likely and
its level of representativeness (congruent vs. incongruent).
The between-subject factor was the time condition (free time
vs. limited time).
Results
Manipulation checks Participants in the free time condi-
tion spent more time completing the questionnaire and took
more time to evaluate conclusions than those in the lim-
ited time condition (see Table 2). Independent samples t-
tests confirmed observed differences were statistically signif-
icant both for the total time spent on the questionnaire and
the response time; t(88) = 3.18, p = .001, one-tailed, and
t(88) = 5.74, p< .001, one-tailed, respectively.
Table 2: Mean total time spent on the on-line questionnaire
and mean time taken to evaluate conclusions as a function of
time condition.
Free time Limited time
M(SD) M(SD)
Total time (min) 00:11 (00:05) 00:08 (00:04)
Response time (sec) 19.52 (11.58) 09.04 (01.68)
Acceptance rates As the top panel of Figure 2 illustrates,
acceptance rates were higher for statements that were con-
gruent with the stereotype activated by the description than
for those that were incongruent; M = 69.25 (SD = 24.31)
vs. M = 28.60 (SD= 23.18), respectively. Individuals, how-
ever, were also sensitive to the logical validity of the conclu-
sion presented as they accepted correct statements more often
than incorrect ones; M = 59.26 (SD= 26.27) vs. M = 38.59
(SD = 21.34), respectively. A 2 (validity) × 2 (congru-
ence) × 2 (time condition) mixed analysis of variance was
conducted on these data. The main effect of congruence
was significant, F(1,88) = 136.04, p < .001,η2p = .61, as
was the main effect of logical validity, F(1,88) = 34.12, p<
.001,η2p = .28, but the main effect of time condition was not,
F(1,88) = 1.93, p > .05. None of the interactions were sig-
nificant, largest non-reliable F(1,88) = 2.83 for the interac-
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tion between validity and congruence.3.
Table 3: Mean values of the logic and representativeness in-
dex as a function of the response time condition.
Free time Limited time
M(SD) M(SD)
logic index 1.04 (1.99) 1.44 (2.03)
representativeness index 2.76 (1.98) 2.12 (1.97)
Finally, following Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005), two
indices were computed for each participant. A logic index
(CC + CI - IC - II) measured the difference between accep-
tance of correct and incorrect conclusions and ranged from
+6 (perfectly logical) to -6 (absolutely illogical). A represen-
tativeness index (CC + IC - CI - II) measured the difference
between acceptance of conclusions that were congruent or in-
congruent with the stereotype activated. This index ranged
from +6 (always heuristic) to -6 (absolutely not heuristic).
Table 2 summarises the descriptive results for these indices.
Contrary to dual-systems predictions, participants’ responses
were not less logical under time pressure; t(88) = −0.94,
p = .35. Moreover, and also contrary to theoretical pre-
dictions, under time pressure, responses were not more in-
fluenced by representativeness assessments; t(88) = 1.51,
p = .14. Finally, whereas acceptance rates were more in-
fluenced by representativeness than by logic under free time
(t(48) =−3.59, p< .005), this was no longer true under time
pressure; t(40) =−1.40, p= .17.
Response times Average response times for accepting each
type of conclusion presented (CC, CI, IC, II) were screened
for multivariate outliers using theMahalanobis distance mea-
sure (D2). No outliers were identified (SmallestD2= .54, p=
.03) and all participants’ response times were retained for
the analyses. The acceptance time data were analysed with
a 2× 2× 2 mixed ANOVA. The main effect of congruence
was significant, F(1,88) = 6.00, p< .02, η2p = .06 as well as
the main effect of time condition, F(1,88) = 11.91, p< .002,
η2p = .12, while the main effect of validity was not, F < 1. Of
greater interest was the significant interaction between valid-
ity and congruence, F(1,88) = 72.64, p < .001, η2p = .45,
accounting for most of the variance. No other interactions
were significant, largest non-reliable F(1,88) = 3.33 for the
interaction between congruence and time condition. As the
bottom panel of Figure 2 illustrates, individuals were quicker
to accept conclusions that were congruent and correct com-
pared to congruent but incorrect ones;M= 6.73s (SD= 5.15)
vs. M = 15.57s (SD = 14.21), respectively. By contrast,
they took longer to accept conclusions that were incongru-
3The careful reader may notice that participants with limited
time seemed more likely to accept correct but incongruent state-
ments than those with free time; M = 49.59,SD = 35.84 vs. M =
33.33,SD= 35.83. Although potentially meaningful, this difference
is not statistically significant if we correct for familywise error;
t(85) =−2.11, p= .04> .0125(.05÷4).
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Figure 2: Mean acceptance rate and acceptance time as a
function of conclusion validity, congruency with the stereo-
type activated, and response time condition
ent but correct compared to incongruent and incorrect ones;
M= 12.35s(SD= 12.78) vs. M= 4.31s (SD= 8.58), respec-
tively. This pattern of results remain unchanged by time pres-
sure. Individuals responded more quickly when pressured by
time; M = 11.94s (SD = 8.17) vs. M = 7.54s (SD = 8.93),
respectively.
Discussion
According to the lax-monitoring view of cognitive function-
ing, conjunction fallacies occur because people solely rely on
representativeness attributes to make their judgments. More-
over, those judgments are assumed to be hasty and individ-
uals are assumed to be reluctant to ‘think hard’ (Kahneman
& Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003). The present experi-
ment provided the first empirical test of this claim. Results
confirmed that judgments were heavily influenced by con-
siderations of representativeness as statements presenting the
most representative outcome as the most probable were more
often endorsed than statements presenting an unrepresenta-
tive outcome as most probable. However, those results also
pointed to the fact that individuals are sensitive to the logic
of sets which underpins the conjunction rule since statements
presenting a single event (independently of its representative-
ness) as more probable than a conjunction were more often
endorsed than statements presenting the conjunction of events
as more probable. This result is at odds with predictions of
the lax-monitoring view and, instead, lends support to the
conflict-monitoring view of cognitive functioning (De Neys
& Glumicic, 2008). They reveal that, even when thinking
about probabilities—as opposed to easier formats such as fre-
quencies (Hertwig et al., 2008)—individuals’ cognitive pro-
cessing is not solely based on heuristic considerations. They
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do appear to think hard when heuristic and logic responses
are in conflict. In fact, they spent twice as long thinking about
their answer in such instances.
The present study also allowed testing an assumption
shared by both of the above-mentioned views: namely, that
attribute substitution is a rapid and automatic response origi-
nating from the intuitive mode of cognitive functioning. Re-
liance on heuristic processing was therefore expected to in-
crease under time pressure while logical responding was ex-
pected to decrease. Results did not confirm these predictions.
In fact, when people did not have the leisure to think as long
as they wished, they tended to be less influenced by repre-
sentativeness considerations although time pressure did not
affect their sensitivity to the logic of sets. If anything, it
lessened the influence of representativeness considerations on
judgments compared to that of logical considerations. Even
when pressured by time, individuals spent longer respond-
ing to items which where logically correct but incongruent
with representativeness considerations or incorrect but con-
gruent with such considerations. If replicated, such prelimi-
nary results would bear important consequences for our un-
derstanding of the type of processing underpinning attribute-
substitution. Future research could seek to triangulate those
results by burdening executive resources with an attention-
demanding secondary task (e.g., see De Neys, 2006).
One possible explanation for these finding is that sensitiv-
ity to logical considerations arises from rapid rule-based pro-
cessing (Sloman, 1996). Accordingly, the logical response
would come first and depend solely on the formal structure of
the statement, and not on its the meaning. The data collected
in this experiment, however, offered no support for this expla-
nation: under time pressure, the more valid responses indi-
viduals gave, the longer they thought about each answer they
gave; r = .83, p< .001, suggesting they detected the conflict
between representativeness and logic and therefore processed
content. This relationship was still positive under free time,
although it was only marginally significant; r = .27, p= .06.
Conclusions
This study presented a novel methodology for studying the
cognitive underpinnings of the conjunction fallacy, which al-
lowed a more precise determination of whether participants
actually detect the conflict between what considerations of
representativeness dictate and what the logic of sets entails.
This in turn allowed demonstrating that intuitions regard-
ing the conjunction rule of probabilities are not solely influ-
enced by heuristic processing and that people think longest
when there is a conflict between the heuristic-based response
and the logic-based response. Moreover, contrary to what
is commonly assumed, representativeness assessments were
not rapid and automatic. In fact, it is when people had time
to think that they were most influenced by representativeness.
These results apply to intuitions arising from subjective prob-
ability considerations. Future research could extend on these
results to see if they hold when judgments are frequency-
based since frequency formats foster higher rates of logical
responding (Hertwig et al., 2008).
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